Fifth-generation (5G) Standalone networks introduce a service-based and cloud-native architecture in which network functions are dynamically discovered and interconnected through standardized APIs. While prior research has extensively examined protocol vulnerabilities, attack surfaces, and detection-oriented mechanisms, comparatively limited attention has been given to deception-oriented approaches tailored to the operational characteristics of Service Based Architecture (SBA) environments.This paper proposes a formal 5G-native deception framework for Standalone core networks that extends graph-based attacker progression modeling with deception-aware interaction semantics and telemetry-oriented observability. Rather than treating deception as isolated service emulation, the proposed framework models attacker interaction as a relationship-centric process incorporating service discovery, network function relationships, trust assumptions, slice-aware contexts, and telco-cloud operational dependencies.The framework formalizes attacker progression and deception behavior through coupled state-driven abstractions, introduces deception effectiveness metrics, and presents a conceptual reference architecture for practical instantiation.Rather than experimentally evaluating a specific honeypot implementation, this work establishes a methodological foundation for future empirical assessment, adaptive deception strategies, and telemetry-driven evaluation in 5G Standalone infrastructures.
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- A 5G-Native Deception Framework for Standalone Core Networks: Formal Threat and Deception Modeling